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INTRODUCTION

Legal certainty IS a central tenet of the rule of law as
understood around the world.! For example, the Foreign
Ministers of the G82 declared in their meeting at Potsdam in
2007 their nations' commitment to "the rule of law [as a] core
principleD on which we build our partnership and our efforts to
promote lasting peace, security, democracy and human rights as
well as sustainable development worldwide."3 They stated that
it is "imperative to adhere to the principleD ... of legal
certainty."4
While the United States is among the strongest proponents
of the rule of law,5 American jurists do not speak of legal
certainty-at least, not anymore. 6 While the term "legal
certainty" is English, it is not American English. 7 American
academics who address certainty of law use another term, "legal
indeterminacy";S practicing lawyers by and large do not use
either of these terms. 9 Both groups of jurists seem resigned to
ubiquitous uncertainty. 10

1. See Danilo Zolo, The Rule of Law: A Critical Appraisal, in THE RULE OF LAW:
HISTORY, THEORY AND CRITICISM 3, 24 (Pietro Costa & Danilo Zolo eds., 2007). Zolo seeks
a uniform rule of law common to the four principal variations he sees in the rule of lawthe British, North American, German, and French. See id. at 7.
2. Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the
United States. University of Toronto GS Information Centre, What is the G8?, http://
www.gS.utoronto.ca/what_is_gS.html (last visited Oct. 26, 200S).
3. GS Foreign Ministers, Declaration of GS Foreign Ministers on the Rule of Law
(2007), http://www.gS.utoronto.calforeigniformin070530-law.pdf. [hereinafter GS
Declaration].
4. Id.; accord The Rule of Law at the National and International Levels, G.A. Res.
62170, U.N. Doc AlRES172170 (Dec. 6,2007).
5. See James R. Maxeiner, Legal Certainty: A European Alternative to American
Legal Indeterminacy?, 15 TUL. J. INT'L & COMPo L. 541, 545-46 (2007) [hereinafter
Maxeiner, European Alternative to American Legal Indeterminacy].
6. See id. at 544.
7. See id. at 543--45.
S. See id. at 543--44.

9. See id.
10. See id.
usage. See, e.g.,

The term legal uncertainty has not, however, vanished from popular
Lisa Leff, California Gay-Marriage Ban Creates Legal Uncertainty,
Assoc. PRESS, Nov. 7, 200S, available at http://www.huffingtonpost.coml200S!11107!
california-gaymarriage-ba_n_142013.html.
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The Secretary General of the United Nations wisely
counseled, "a common understanding of key concepts is
essential."ll Common efforts to build the rule of law have been
"plagued" by "the failure of many policymakers to examine or
fully understand the very concept of the 'rule oflaw."'12 How are
we to build a partnership based on a concept on which we differ?
This Article seeks to facilitate the international discussion of
legal certainty and the rule of law. It aims: (I) to make
Americans aware that skepticism of legal certainty espoused by
American academics is atypical; (II) to make non-Americans
aware of American skepticism of legal certainty; and (III) to help
Americans and non-Americans alike understand each other
better so that they may more efficiently cooperate. 13

11. The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on the Rule of Law
and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies, "if 5, delivered to the
Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2004/616 (Aug. 23, 2004) [hereinafter Rule of Law and
Transitional Justice] (stating that concepts such as the rule of law "serve both to define
our goals and to determine our methods").
12. JANE STROMSETH ET AL., CAN MIGHT MAKE RIGHTS? BUILDING THE RULE OF
LAw AFTER MILITARY INTERVENTIONS 69 (2006) (emphasis omitted).
13. Since the purpose of this Article is to better inform the international discussion
of the rule of law at international and domestic legal system levels, it focuses on the
practical and the attainable. It has limited goals. It is not concerned with fine
distinctions in academic writings. If professional philosophers happen to read it, they
may find no use for it. See Duncan Kennedy, Legal Formality, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 351, 354
(1973) ("The professional philosopher, who has no understanding of the peculiar
technical interests and needs of law, can see nothing in formalism but ... a clear
derangement of the relationship between form and content." (quoting Rudolf von
Jhering, 2 II Der Geist des romischen Rechts 478-79 (1883) (a. von Mehren trans.»).
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LEGAL CERTAINTY IS THE INTERNATIONAL
BASIS OF THE RULE OF LAw

While at its outer bounds the rule of law may be "an
essentially contested concept,"14 at its core, it promises legal
certainty. 15 According to a recent publication of the
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD), "... the concept first and foremost seeks to emphasize
the necessity of establishing a rule-based society in the interest
of legal certainty and predictability."16
A legal system that provides legal certainty guides those
subject to the law. 17 It permits those subject to the law to plan
their lives with less uncertainty.18 It protects those subject to
the law from arbitrary use of state power. 19
The centrality of legal certainty to the thinking of
continental jurists is not well appreciated by American
academics captivated by legal indeterminacy.20 For the great
German legal philosopher, Gustav Radbruch, legal certaintyalong with justice and policy-was . one of only three

14. Neil MacCormick, Der Rechtsstaat und die Rule of Law, JURISTENZEITUNG,
Jan. 1984, at 65, 65-66; Randall Peerenboom, Varieties of Rule of Law, an Introduction
and Provisional Conclusion, in ASIAN DISCOURSES OF RULE OF LAW: THEORIES AND
IMPLEMENTATION OF RULE OF LAw IN TWELVE ASIAN COUNTRIES, FRANCE AND THE U.S. 1
(Randall Peerenboom ed., 2004); see also RONALD A. CASS, THE RULE OF LAw IN AMERICA
1 (2001) ("'the rule of law' still means very different things to different people").
15. See, e.g., Gerhard Casper, Rule of Law? Whose Law? (Center on Democracy,
Development, and the Rule of Law, Working Paper No. 10, 2004), reprinted in
FESTSCHRIFT FUR ANDREAS HELDRICH ZUM 70. GEBURTSTAG 1109 (Stephan Lorenz et al.
eds., 2005); see also Danilo Zolo, supra note 1 (contending that a state must guarantee
foreseeability in the law).
16. DECD DEVELOPMENT AsSISTANCE COMMITTEE, ISSUES BRIEF: EQUAL ACCESS
TO JUSTICE AND THE RULE OF LAw 2 (2005) [hereinafter DECD], http://www.oecd.org!
dataoecdl26!51135785471.pdf. Enumerations of the requirements of the rule of law
typically include legal certainty. See G8 Declaration, supra note 3; Rule of Law and
Transitional Justice, supra note 11, ~ 5.
17. See James R. Maxeiner, Legal Indeterminacy Made in America: U.S. Legal
Methods and the Rule of Law, 41 VAL. U. L. REV. 517, 522 (2006) [hereinafter Maxeiner,
Legal Indeterminacy Made in America].
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. See id. at 520-23.
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fundamental pillars of the very idea of law. 21 Radbruch's
contemporary, Ludwig Bendix, colorfully made the point in a
way that scarcely permits forgetting: "[t]he concept of legal
certainty is a central concept of [our] inherited legal methods, in
which all have grown up[; i]t is the air in which all jurists have
learned to breathe."22 Bendix was such a believer in legal
certainty that, upon his release in May 1937 from the Nazi
concentration camp at Dachau, he began to prepare a lawsuit
against the camp's commandant. 23 He surely would have
brought the suit had his children not first hustled him out of the
country to the safety of realist America. 24
Bendix was the truest of true believers, but commitment to
legal certainty such as his is characteristic of European legal
systems. 25 Legal certainty is a "general principle of EC law."26 It
is one of a handful of legal concepts so recognized by the
European Court of Justice and the European Court of Human
Rights. 27 It is a fundamental principle of the national legal
systems of Europe: 28 in Germany it is Rechtssicherheit,29 in

21. Heather Leawoods, Gustav Radbruch: An Extraordinary Legal Philosopher, 2
WASH. U. J.L. & POL'y 489,493 (2000).
22. LUDWIG BENDIX, DAS PROBLEM DER RECHTSSICHERHEIT. ZUR EINFUHRUNG DES
RELATIVISMUS IN DIE RECHTSANWENDUNGSLEHRE 2 (1914) (Author's translation).
23. REINHARD BENDIX, FROM BERLIN TO BERKELEY, GERMAN-JEWISH IDENTITIES
172 (1986).
24. Id.
25. See id.;

LUDWIG BENDIX, supra note 22, at 2; see also JUHA RAITIO, THE
PRINCIPLE OF LEGAL CERTAINTY IN EC LAw 125-30 (2003).
26. RAITIO, supra note 25, at 125; see ANDREAS VON ARNAULD,
RECHTSSICHTERHEIT: PERSPEKTIVISCHE ANNAHERUNGEN AN EINE IDEE DIRECTRICE DES
RECHTS 661-62 (2006).
27. See Patricia Popelier, Legal Certainty and Principles of Proper Law Making, 2
EUR. J. L. REFORM 321, 327-28 (2000) (summarizing PATRICIA POPELIER,
RECHTSZEKERHEID ALS BEGINSEL VAN BEHOORLIJKE REGELGEVING (1997»; RAITIO, supra
note 25, at 125-30; TAKIS TRIDIMAS, THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF EU LAw 4 (2d
ed. 2006).
28. See RAITIO, supra note 25, at 125-36.
29. Maxeiner, European Alternative to American Legal Indeterminacy, supra note 5
at 551 nA9; see also VON ARNAULD, supra note 26 at 661-62 (2006).
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France securite juridique,30 in Spain La seguridad juridica,31 in
Italy certezza del diritto,32 in the Benelux countries rechtszekerheid,33 in Sweden rattssakerhet,34 in Poland do obowiq,zujqcego
prawa,35 and in Finland oikeusuarmuuden periaate. 36 Legal
certainty has even made its way back into English through the
common law systems of the United Kingdom. 37 A legal system
without a modicum of legal certainty is scarcely worthy of the
name.
As a general principle of European legal systems, legal
certainty "requires that all law be sufficiently precise to allow
the person-if need be, with appropriate advice-to foresee, to a
degree that is reasonable in the circumstances, the consequences
which a given action may entail."38 It means that: (1) laws and
decisions must be made public; (2) laws and decisions must be
definite and clear; (3) decisions of courts must be binding; (4)
limitations on retroactivity of laws and decisions must be
imposed; and (5) legitimate expectations must be protected. 39
Elsewhere I have shown at length how legal certainty is indeed
heightened in one EU country, Germany.40

30. Maxeiner, European Alternative to American Legal Indeterminacy, supra note
5, at 551 n.48; see also RAITIO, supra note 25, at 128.
31. Maxeiner, European Alternative to American Legal Indeterminacy, supra note
5, at 551 n.52.
32. Id. at 551 n.50.
33. Id. at 550 n.47.
34. Id. at 551 n.55.
35. Id. at 551 n.53.
36. Id. at 551 n.56.
37. See RAITIO, supra note 25, at 127.
38. Korchuganova v. Russia, No. 75039/01, Judgment, ~ 47 (Eur. Ct. H.R. June 8,
2006), available at httpi/cmiskp.echr.coe.intltkp197Iviewhbkm.asp?action=open&table=F69A27
FD8F'B86142BFOICl166DEA398649&key=56853&sessionId=14913646&skin=hudoc-en&attach
ment=true.
39. See TRIDIMAS, supra note 27, at 242-57; VON ARNAULD, supra note 26, ch. 7.II
(citing numerous decisions of the European Court of Justice and asserting tenets of legal
certainty in European law).
40. See Maxeiner, European Alternative to American Legal Indeterminacy, supra
note 5, at 553-54.
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III. "WE ARE ALL REALISTS Now" IS THE AMERICAN CREDO
While jurists elsewhere in the world talk of legal certainty,
in America they do not.41 While once American legal academics
spoke of legal certainty, today they speak of legal
indeterminacy.42 They reject legal certainty because they know
better, or so they think. 43 Their credo is, "we are all realists
now."44
The "realists" were a loose group of mostly academic jurists
in the United States in the 1920s and 1930s who critiqued what
they saw as the prevailing "formalist" American legal system. 45
They thought judges judged without an accurate understanding
of the way things actually were. 46 When American jurists today
say "we are all realists now," they mean that contemporary
American lawyers work with "a full awareness of the limitations
and flaws in the law and the complexity and openness of judicial
decision making."47
Sophisticated American jurists today no longer believe in
legal certainty as an attainable or even desirable goa1. 48
According to Professors Jules Coleman and Brian Leiter, "only
ordinary citizens, some jurisprudes, and first year law students

41. See id. at 601 (noting a belief that "wholesale indeterminacy is an inevitable
feature of modern legal systems").
42. Id. at 543-44.
43. Id. at 544.
44. Stephen A. Smith, Taking Law Seriously, 50 U. TORONTO L.J. 241, 247 (2000)
("The slogan 'we are all realists now' is so well-accepted in North America-in particular
in the United States-that an unstated working assumption of most legal academics is
that judicial explanations of a judgment tell us little if anything about why a case was
decided as it was.").
45. Karl N. Llewellyn, Some Realism About Realism-Responding to Dean Pound,
44 HARV. L. REV. 1222, 1223-35 (1931).
46. See id. at 1236-37.
47. Smith, supra note 44, at 247; Brian Z. Tamanaha, The Realism of the
''Formalist'' Age, in ST. JOHN'S UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW LEGAL STUDIES RESEARCH
PAPER SERIES 1, 8 (2007), available at http://ssrn.comlabstract=985083.
48. Maxeiner, European Alternative to American Legal Indeterminacy, supra note
5, at 543-44.
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have a working conception of law as determinate."49 Many
American jurists regard legal certainty as a chimera, an
infantile longing, a childhood belief that one gets over, just as
one gets over belief in Santa Claus or the Wizard of Oz. 50 In
their assessment, they hearken back to the opinion of Judge
Jerome Frank, the noted realist, who in his 1930 book Law and
the Modern Mind challenged the idea that legal decisions are
always certain. 51 Frank deprecated as a childish myth the idea
that law could ever be certain. 52 His criticism was effective; by
the 1960s the term "legal certainty" had fallen out of use. 53
Ironically, most legal realists did not share Frank's extreme
views of legal certainty. 54 They did not argue that judicial
decisions are always uncertain. 55 Most did not even argue that
judicial decisions are usually .uncertain. 56 Karl Llewellyn,
perhaps the best known of the legal realists, agreed that law is
not always certain, but did not agree that law is necessarily
uncertain. 57 Indeed, as the principal drafter of the Uniform

49. Jules L. Coleman & Brian Leiter, Determinacy, Objectivity, and Authority, 142
PA. L. REV. 549, 579 n.54 (1993). Much of the populace at large, however, clings to the
idea of legal certainty. Vivian Grosswald Curran, Romantic Common Law, Enlightened
Civil Law: Legal Uniformity and the Homogenization of the European Union, 7 COLUM.
J. EUR. L. 63, 82 (2001). American law professors report that their first year law
students must "un-learn" the idea that rules decide cases. Id.
50. E.g., Craig M. Bradley, The Uncertainty Principle in the Supreme Court, 1986
DUKE L.J. 1,63.
51. Julius Paul, Jerome Frank's Attack on the "Myth" of Legal Certainty, 36 NEB. L.
REV. 547, 547-49 (1957); see JEROME FRANK, LAw AND THE MODERN MIND 244 (1930)
(asserting that legal certainty does not exist).
52. Id. at 547; see also Wilfrid R. Rumble, American Legal Realism and the
Reduction of Uncertainty, 13 J. PUB. L. 45, 45-46 (1964); Wilfrid R. Rumble, RuleSkepticism and the Role of the Judge: A Study of American Legal Realism, 15 J. PUB. L.
251, 258-60 (1966) [hereinafter Rumble II].
53. See Rumble II, supra note 52, at 260.
54. BRIAN LEITER, NATURALIZING JURISPRUDENCE: ESSAYS ON AMERICAN LEGAL
REALISM AND NATURALISM IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 17 (2007).
55. Id. at 19.
56. Id. at 19-20.
57. Karl Llewellyn, On Reading and Using the Newer Jurisprudence, 40 COLUM. L.
REV. 581, 599 (1940) ("It does not show 'uncertainty' in the law .... What it shows is
lack of 100 percent certainty, and that is all it shows.").

U.

2008]

SOME REALISM ABOUT LEGAL CERTAINTY

35

Commercial Code, America's most European piece of legislation,
Llewellyn invested heavily in bringing certainty to American
law. 58
Yet today, three quarters of a century later, legal certainty
has disappeared as a concept of the American legal system and
as a goal to strive for; legal indeterminacy has become the
common "conceptual terrain."59 The term "legal indeterminacy"
in its present sense made its first appearances only in the 1960s
and did not achieve currency until the 1980s, when a new group
of legal academics, known as "crits" (from Critical Legal
Studies), adopted it.60 Some of them endorsed the more radical
position espoused by Frank that legal decisions are always
uncertain. 61
Legal indeterminacy means that law does not always
determine the answer to a legal question. 62 According to the
strongest version of the "indeterminacy thesis," known as
"radical indeterminacy," law is always indefinite and never
certain, any decision is legally justifiable in any case, and law is
nothing more than politics by another name. 63 Scholars quickly
dispatched this point. 64
While few American jurists accept a strong version of
indeterminacy, most academics, and perhaps most lawyers,
believe
m
a
weaker
verSIOn
sometimes
termed

58. See Richard E. Coulson, Private Law Codes and the Uniform Commercial
Code-Comments on History, 27 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 615, 627 (identifying Professor
Llewellyn as the chief reporter of the Uniform Commercial Code).
59. LEITER, supra note 54, at 9.
60. John Hasnas, Back to the Future: From Critical Legal Studies Forward to Legal
Realism, or How Not to Miss the Point of the Indeterminacy Argument, 45 DUKE L.J. 84,

85 (1995).
61. LEITER, supra note 54, at 15, 17 (speaking of "Frankification" of realism).
62. Maxeiner, European Alternative to American Legal Indeterminacy, supra
5, at 543.

note

63. Id.
64. See Ken Kress, Legal Indeterminacy, 77 CAL. L. REV. 283, 283 (1989); Lawrence
B. Solum, On the Indeterminacy Crisis: Critiquing Critical Dogma, 54 U. CHI. L. REV.
462, 462 (1987) [hereinafter Indeterminacy Crisis); Lawrence B. Solum, Indeterminacy,
in A COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND LEGAL THEORY 488 (Dennis Patterson ed.,
1996) (summarizing and challenging the "radical indeterminacy" argument).
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"underdeterminacy."65 Underdeterminacy means that while the
law constrains judicial decision, it does not uniquely determine
it. 66
This does not seem to be a particular advance on what
Llewellyn and other Americans-including this Author relying
on Llewellyn-said decades ago. 67 To jurists schooled in civil law
methods, it is quite unremarkable. Karl Engisch, in his classic
work on legal method, wrote long ago that binding to a statute
"will always be a question of more or less."68
Legal certainty and legal indeterminacy are not
complements. 69 Legal indeterminacy as a legal proposition has
narrower application than does legal certainty.70 As far as
individuals are concerned, legal certainty serves two distinct
functions: it guides them in complying with the law, and it
protects them against arbitrary government action by
controlling the use of the power to make and apply law.71

65. See, e.g., Indeterminacy Crisis, supra note 64; Lee J. Strang, An Originalist
Theory of Precedent: Originalism, Nonoriginalist Precedent, and the Common Good, 36
N.M. L. REV. 419 (2006); Lawrence B. Solum, Legal Theory Lexicon 036: Indeterminacy,

http://lsolum.typepad.comllegal_theory_lexiconl2004/05llegaLtheory_le_2.h tml
(last
visited Oct. 26, 2008).
66. According to Lawrence B. Solum:
[1] The law is determinate with respect to a given case if and only if the set
of legally acceptable outcomes contains one and only one member. [2] The
law is underdeterminate with respect to a given case if and only if the set of
legally acceptable outcomes is a nonidentical subset of the set of all possible
results. [3] The law is indeterminate with respect to a given case if the set of
legally acceptable outcomes is identical with the set of all possible results.
Solum, supra note 65.
67. Llewellyn, supra note 57; JAMES MAXEINER, POLICY AND METHODS IN GERMAN
AND AMERICAN ANTITRUST LAw: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 28 (1986) [hereinafter
MAxEINER, POLICY AND METHODS] (speaking of "negative" and "positive" binding).
68. KARL ENGISCH, EINFUHRUNG IN DAS JURISTISCHE DENKEN 136 (1st ed. 1956)
("Es wird sich immer nur urn die Frage des mehr oder Minder der Bindung an das
Gesetz handeln.").
69. See Maxeiner, European Alternative to American Legal Indeterminacy, supra
note 5, at 601.
70. See Maxeiner, Legal Indeterminacy Made in America, supra note 17, at 552.
71. See MAxEINER, POLICY AND METHODS, supra note 67, at 10-11.
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American legal indeterminacy is concerned principally only with
the latter;72 it is interested in the former only incidentally in
that it is concerned with predicting appellate decisions. 73
Legal indeterminacy is principally a theory of appellate
judicial decision making. 74 It assumes the perspective of
appellate judges. 75 By focusing on whether rules require
appellate judges to reach particular correct answers, the
American discussion of legal indeterminacy overstates the level
of uncertainty and underestimates opportunities for decreasing
it.76
Controlling appellate decisions is only one concern of legal
certainty.77 Legal certainty is concerned more generally with
controlling legal decisions of all types,78 and more broadly still,
with guiding persons subject to law. 79 Perfect precision is not
essential for substantial fulfillment of the guidance function. 8o
Legal certainty thus includes the perspective of law abiding
subjects as well as that oflaw appliers.81
These different concerns mean that there is no inverse
correlation between legal certainty and legal indeterminacy.82 A
high level of legal certainty can be consistent with a high level of
legal indeterminacy.83 For example, judicial decisions may be
72. See id.
73. See id.
74. See LEITER, supra note 54, at 19-20. Leiter makes the point that the realists
focused on appellate decision making. Id. Since then, many American jurists have used
indeterminacy with respect to judicial decisions generally. See Chris Guthrie et aI.,
Blinking on the Bench: How Judges Decide Cases, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 2 (2007). The
American study of law emphasizes judicial decision making and, in particular, appellate
decision making. See id. at 3-4.
75. See, e.g., E.W. THOMAS, THE JUDICIAL PROCESS: REALISM, PRAGMATISM,
PRACTICAL REASONING AND PRINCIPLES 108-09 (2005).
76. See Maxeiner, Legal Indeterminacy Made in America, supra note 17, at 523.
77. See MAxEINER, POLICY AND METHODS, supra note 67, at 10-12.
78. Maxeiner, European Alternative to American Legal Indeterminacy, supra note
5, at 546.
79. Id. at 11 (noting how German law distinguishes Orientierungs from
Realisierungssicherheit) .
80. Id. at 11-12.
81. See Maxeiner, Legal Indeterminacy Made in America, supra note 17, at 524.
82. LEITER, supra note 54, at 60.
83. See id.
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certain, even though they are subject to little control, if who the
decision maker is, is certain and that decision maker for reasons
external to legal rules decides predictably.84 Or judicial
decisions may be sufficiently certain for guidance purposes, if
the grounds for their invocation or if their consequences are
clearly constrained. 85

IV. LEGAL CERTAINTY AS LEITMOTIF FOR LEGAL METHODS
The importance of legal certainty transcends that of its
constituent rules and principles. 86 It is, as Andreas von Arnauld
has said, an "idee-directrice" or "Leitgedanke," that is, a guiding
idea or leitmotif for the entire legal system. 87 The extent and the
manner in which it is incorporated into positive law varies from
system to system, but its realization in some form is essential to
individual autonomy.88 Its importance derives less from
providing an independent basis for reviewing legal decision (its
sub-principles provide that basis) and more from being an
omnipresent guiding idea protecting personal autonomy.89 Long
before individual decisions are reached, legal certainty is a
consideration in how those decisions will be made. 9o Legal
certainty is central to the creation of the legal methods by which
law is made, interpreted, and applied. 91 Legal indeterminacy
cannot and does not have the same guiding function that legal
certainty has. 92 When indeterminacy is expected and even
embraced, rules recede in importance. 93 Some American
academics put in their place process. 94 Their idea is, if we are
84. Leiter speaks of decisions that may not be "rationally Ddeterminate" but are
"causally determinate." Id. at 9.
85. See MAXEINER, POLICY AND METHODS, supra note 67, at 26--27 (speaking of
"negative binding").
86. VON ARNAULD, supra note 26, at 661-64.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 662-64,691-92.
89. See Maxeiner, Legal Indeterminacy Made in America, supra note 17, at 523--25.
90. See MAXEINER, POLICY AND METHODS, supra note 67, at 11.
91. Id. at 10-11.
92. See Maxeiner, Legal Indeterminacy Made in America, supra note 17, at 552
(explaining the differences in effect between certainty and indeterminacy).
93. Id.
94. Id.
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unable to guarantee a decision according to law, i.e., according
to legal rules, at least we can guarantee a decision according to a
lawful process. 95
The legal indeterminacy thesis is not, however, the cause of
this development. The thesis has achieved acceptance because
American law is uncertain. 96 American legal methods function
less well than do their foreign counterparts. 97
Space does not allow more than ticking off some of the more
prominent legal certainty-enhancing methods that are routine in
other legal systems, but are deficient or lacking in the American.
Many of these methods were once subjects of protracted and
mostly unsuccessful American law reform efforts.98

A. Lawmaking
1.

Legal Rules are Syllogistic Norms; They Determine Their
Consequences and Who May Invoke and Apply Them. 99

Legal rules guide people's actions and judges'
decisions. 100 Legal norms prescribe particular outcomes
when generally described states of fact are present. lOl
While legal rules cannot always be precise and definite,
and while they cannot always exclude judgment and
discretion in their application and enforcement, they
. can always state who may invoke them, who may apply
them, and what the consequences of application may
be. l02

95. Id. at

525-26, 552.

96. See id. at 518.
97. See Maxeiner, European Alternative to American Legal Indeterminacy, supra
note 5, at 605-06.
98. Id. at 587.
99. Maxeiner, Legal Indeterminacy Made in America, supra note 17, at 555, 573.
100. Maxeiner, European Alternative to American Legal Indeterminacy, supra note
5, at 524.
101. Maxeiner, Legal Indeterminacy Made in America, supra note 17, at 556.
102. Id. at 559.
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Legal Rules are Consistent and Coordinated with Other
Legal Rules. 103

Legal rules are internally consistent. l04 They are
routinely coordinated with other legal rules of the same
jurisdiction and with rules of other jurisdictions. 105

3.

Authority to Make and Apply Legal Rules is Bestowed
Guardedly. 106

Government presents a single face to citizens on most
legal questions. l07 Law abiding people need not choose
which of the government's rules to comply with or
which of the government's courts to petition. l08 Federal
and state governments coordinate their legislation,
administration, and adjudication well. 109 State
governments control the limited lawmaking authority
they allow local governments. 110

4.

Legal Rules are Impartially Prepared in a Professional
Process. 111

Formal systems for lawmaking improve legislation
quality and reduce opportunities for special interest
and amateur influence in legislative drafting. 112
Legislation usually originates in a government ministry

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 602.
107. Id.; Maxeiner, European Alternative to American Legal Indeterminacy, supra
note 5, at 522.
108. Maxeiner, European Alternative to American Legal Indeterminacy, supra note
5, at 559-64.
109. Id. at 574.
110. Maxeiner, Legal Indeterminacy Made in America, supra note 17, at 599.
111. Maxeiner, European Alternative to American Legal Indeterminacy, supra note
5, at 532; OECD, supra note 16, at 2.
112. Maxeiner, European Alternative to American Legal Indeterminacy, supra note
5, at 532.
103.
104.
105.
106.
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having professional competence in the field. 113 It is
routinely subject to intergovernmental vetting before
adoption by the legislature. 114

B. Law Finding and Judicial Lawmaking
5.

Judges Know the Legal Rules.1 15

Judges know the law; the maxim jura nouit cuna
applies. 116 Courts ordinarily spend little time
determining which rules apply.1 17

6.

Judges Do Not See Their Job as Routinely Making New
Legal Rules.1 18

Even in modern legal systems, not all
statutory;119 judge-made law is necessary.1 20
most modern legal systems, judge-made
exceptional; judges do not see making law as a
part, let alone as the essence, of their jobs. 121

law IS
But III
law is
routine

113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 536 (describing the way in which judges find the appropriate rules).
116. Except in England. See F.A. Mann, Fusion of the Legal Professions?, 93 LAw
Q. REV. 367, 369 (1977).
117. See id. at 369-70 (arguing that in the English and Irish systems the law has
little to do with legal decision making).
118. Maxeiner, European Alternative to American Legal Indeterminacy, supra note
5, at 534-35; Maxeiner, Legal Indeterminacy Made in America, supra note 17, at 562.
119. Maxeiner, Legal Indeterminacy Made in America, supra note 17, at 534.
120. Id. at 535.
121. Maxeiner, European Alternative to American Legal Indeterminacy, supra note
5, at 534-35.

HOUSTON JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

42

[Vol. 31:1

C. Law Applying

7.

Professional Judges Apply Legal Rules to Facts. 122

Judges are professionals. 123 They are trained to be
judges. 124

8.

Applying Legal Rules to Facts Is the Principal Goal of
Legal Procedure;125 It Requires Written Justification. 126

There are routine methods for applying rules to facts
that make it possible for others, namely participants
and reviewing courts, to reproduce the process of
decision. 127 Participants are entitled to justified
decisions that rationally relate legal decisions to
substantive law.1 28

9.

Courts Take Evidence Only on Material, Disputed
Facts. 129

Rules by their nature single out certain facts as
determinative (material elements) and exclude other
facts from consideration. 130 Courts ordinarily take
evidence only on factual questions that are both
material and disputed.1 31

122. James R. Maxeiner, Guiding Litigation: Applying Law to Facts in Germany
(Common Good Forum, The Boundaries of Litigation: A Forum Addressing the
Alignment of Civil Justice with Social Goals, Washington, D.C., Apr. 15, 2008), available
at http://ssrn.comlabstract=1230453; MAXEINER, POLICY AND METHODS, supra
note 67, at 83.
123. Ric Simmons, Re-Examining the Grand Jury: Is There Room for Democracy in
the Criminal Justice System?, 82 B.U. L. REV. 1,61 (2002).
124. Id.
125. Maxeiner, European Alternative to American Legal Indeterminacy, supra note
5, at 558.
126. MAXEINER, POLICY AND METHODS, supra note 67, at 86.
127. Id.; Maxeiner, Legal Indeterminacy Made in America, supra note 17, at 604.
128. Maxeiner, Legal Indeterminacy Made in America, supra note 17, at 604;
OECD, supra note 16, at 2.
129. Maxeiner, Legal Indeterminacy Made in America, supra note 17, at 604.
130. Id.
131. Id.
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***
What most American academics overlook is that American
jurists, from the adoption of the Constitution through at least
the era of the realists in the 1920s, sought-largely
unsuccessfully-to abandon old and uncertain common law
methods and substitute more modern certainty enhancing
methods along the lines just mentioned. 132
The legal indeterminacy thesis-accepting the "we are all
realists" credo--validates a collective abandonment of legal
certainty as a legitimate goal of the legal system.
Ask an American legal academic what happened to legal
certainty, and he or she is likely to answer, "the law has always
been uncertain and it always will be uncertain."133 Protest that
this is not so on the Continent and the American academic likely
will
suggest-politely-that
Europeans
are
deluding
themselves. 134 Persist, and claim that there is greater legal
certainty in Europe, and the American academic will express
skepticism that this is so and will demand empirical proof. 135
Provide the proof and the American academic will insist that
there are higher values than legal certainty and that the
American legal system prefers those values. 136 Finally, question
132. See generally Maxeiner, Legal Indeterminacy Made in America, supra note 17
(tracing the development of legal indeterminacy in American law). For a refreshing
exception, see Brian Z. Tamanaha, The Bogus Tale About the Legal Formalists (St. John's
Legal Studies Research Paper No. 08-0130, 2008), available at http://ssrn.comlabstract

=1123498.
133. See THOMAS, supra note 75, at 115-16. These words are actually those of a
New Zealand judge, but many American legal academics might have uttered them. Id.
134. See id. at 116.
135. E.g., Robert Allen et aI., The German Advantage in Civil Procedure: A Plea for
More Details and Fewer Generalities in Comparative Scholarship, 82 Nw_ U. L. REV. 705,
708, 761-62 (1988) (challenging the superiority of the German litigation system and
calling for an empirical analysis of the respective approaches to civil procedure, experts,
and qualification of judges). But see Maxeiner, Guiding Litigation, supra note 122
(demonstrating advantages of the German system in applying law).
136. Cf Samuel R. Gross, The American Advantage: The Value of Inefficient
Litigation, 85 MICH. L. REV. 734, 742-47 (1988) (standing for the proposition that the
American legal system may sacrifice efficiency in order to attain other goals such as
superior accuracy, promoting citizens' confidence, and respect for individual autonomy);
see also Howard Bernstein, Whose Advantage After All?, 21 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 587, 599
(1988). The opponents of codification made similar arguments. See JAMES COOLIDGE
CARTER, THE PROPOSED CODIFICATION OF OUR COMMON LAw (1884), reprinted in THE
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whether the American system really accomplishes those aims,
and the American academic will say that it does not really
matter, since the United States probably could not ever adopt
legal methods that produce legal certainty.1 37
Widespread acceptance of the legal indeterminacy thesiseven in a less than radical form-has called into question in the
United States the utility of rules as parts of solutions to social
problems. 138 It has led to resignation. 139 According to Professor
Pierre Schlag and his colleagues, "a great many leading
American legal thinkers have now mostly abandoned 'doing
law."'140 Unable to overcome a problem, they want to move on to
things that they can solve.1 4l Professor Michael Dorf says that
there are more important things to worry about than justifying
judicial lawmaking as law application. 142 Contemporary theory
has reached, he says, a "dead end."143

LIFE OF THE LAw, READINGS ON THE GROWTH OF LEGAL INSTITUTIONS 115, 118 (John
Honnold ed., 1964) (explaining that unwritten law, best described as law that embraces
the rights, obligations, and duties of both person and property, cannot be sufficiently
codified in a scientific system of jurisprudence).
137. C{ John Reitz, Why We Probably Cannot Adopt the German Advantage in
Civil Procedure, 75 IOWA L. REV. 987, 988 (1990) (discussing the impracticability of
modeling the American legal system after the German system).
138. See Maxeiner, Legal Indeterminacy Made in America, supra note 17,
at 519--20.
139. Id.
140. PAUL E. CAMPOS ET AL., AGAINST THE LAw 1 (1996).
141. Id.
142. Michael Dorf, Legal Indeterminacy and Institutional Design, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV.

875,878-79 (2003).
143. Id. at 876.
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CONCLUSION: DEALING WITH EACH OTHER

The insularity of the United States would not matter much
if the United States were a minor power off on its own on a
small island.1 44 But it is not.1 45 It projects its power-and its
concepts-around the globe.1 46 The United States is world
leader in promoting rule of law programs.1 47 So if its jurists
have a peculiar view of the rule of law, they may-if only
inadvertently-impose their view on others.1 48 In their dealings
with others, and in the dealings of others with them, it behooves
all to have an understanding of each others' underlying
assumptions. How are we to accomplish that?
My advice to non-American jurists: do not argue with
American jurists about legal certainty; do not discuss legal
indeterminacy. Do not even talk about the formal rule of law.
Redirect the conversation. Instead of discussing legal certainty,
talk about specifics. No American jurist will debate whether
laws and decisions should be made public. Most will welcome
discussing how judicial decisions can be made more definite and
binding. Raise questions about how courts should limit
retroactivity of laws and how they should protect legitimate
expectations. From there you can go on to talk about how to
draft better laws that can be more easily applied.
My advice to American jurists: do talk about legal certainty.
For a moment stop conversing about controlling judicial
decisions. Take the perspective of ordinary people seeking to
abide by law. Put aside, for one moment, whether you can
predict judges' decisions. Remember that the vast majority of

144. Adam Liptak, U.S. Court, a Longtime Beacon, Is Now Guiding Fewer Nations,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 2008, at AI.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. American programs include: American Bar Association Rule of Law Initiative
(http://www.abanet.org/rol/), Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Democracy &
Rule of Law (http://www.carnegieendowment.org/programs/globalJindex.cfm?fa=proj&id
=101&proj=zdrl), and United States Institute of Peace, Rule of Law Program
(http://www.usip.org/ruleoflaw/index.html).
148. Cf Casper, supra note 15.
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legal questions never come close to a judge's bench. Ask, as an
eminent American jurist once did, does the law make "plain to
the apprehension of the people what conduct on their part is
forbidden"?149 Look to what other legal systems have to offer.
The American system can learn from them. 150

149. Thomas
355 (1888).

M. Cooley, The Uncertainty of the Law, 22

AM.

L. REV.

347,

150. See James R. Maxeiner, Learning from Others: Sustaining the
Internationalization and Globalization of U.S. Law School Curriculums, 32 FORDHAM J.
INT'L L. 501 (2008); Ernst C. Stiefel & James R. Maxeiner, Civil Justice Reform in the
United States: Opportunity for Learning from Civilized European Procedure Instead of
Continued Isolation?, 42AM.J.COMP.L 167 (1994); James R. Maxeiner, 1992: High Time For
American Lawyers to Learn from Europe, or Roscoe Pound's 1906 Address Revisited,
1991 FORDHAM I.L.J. 1.

